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OUTLINE
Some fundamentals of competition and regulation
policy and practice
Application to NZ UFB
Conclusion:
NZ broadband market appears to lack an overarching set of 
consistent and cohesive competition policy objectives
leads to ongoing uncertainty, limits to ability for the industry to 
evolve efficiently
WHAT ARE MARKETS?
Dynamic institutions
buyers and sellers interacting
in response to own incentives to increase individual welfare
Open, complex adaptive systems
interactions evolve over time as incentives alter
subject to external shocks (e.g. technological change, 
regulatory intervention) 
altering any or all of production methods, transactions, institutions, 
activities, resource allocations
SYSTEMIC INTERACTIONS
TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGES
„Natural monopoly‟ cost characteristics of legacy copper 
networks challenged by falling costs of new technologies
bypass investments (at least in urban/metropolitan areas)
Ever more capable networks
e.g. fibre-optic cable
Convergence
to a standard digital format
Divergence 
number of network types moving digital data 
copper, HFC, mobile, wireless, satellite, fibre
application diversity
REGULATION AND MARKETS
Both subject to pressures from technological change
Regulation as an alternative to competition law 
governance
but recent history has been to regulate to achieve more 
efficient outcomes by promoting competition
Regulation too must constantly evolve
e.g. to changes in technologies,  the balance of market 
power
But regulation may also affect the rate of technological 
innovation in a market
e.g. the time of investment in new („frontier‟) technologies
REGULATION
(v) ensuring a 
sustainable industry
 
(iii) allowing consumer 
choice between 
technology platforms
 
(ii) incentivising efficient 
investment in 
infrastructure
 
(i) promotion of 
competition
 
(vii) regulate if clear 
evidence of market 
inefficiencies 
(and no effective non-
regulatory options) 
(iv) minimise 
compliance costs
 
(vi) provide sufficient 
certainty and minimise 
transition distruption
 
Sub-goals:
Goal:
Criteria for intervention:
Constraints on 
intervention:
PRINCIPLES FOR EFFICIENCY-RAISING 
REGULATION
Forward-looking
most efficient outcome IN THE LONG RUN
not used to “settle old scores”
Structures must be able to evolve
pre-determined, ossified industry structures militate against 
efficient evolutionary responses when indicated
stable PRINCIPLES (not industry structures) foster efficient 
industry evolution
Targets markets, not firms
DEFINING A RELEVANT MARKET
Dimensions
Product
broadband; fixed line; technology type?
access; backhaul?
Geographic
national; regional (rural/urban); regional (33 separate territories)?
Functional
Temporal
Customer
business or residential; wholesale or retail?
REGULATORY OBJECTIVES
Intervention only  to increase long-term  market efficiency
Sustainable industry
role of
subsidies? 
regulation-dependent parties?
Trade-offs
allowing customer choice of technology
incentivising infrastructure investment
promotion of competition
Constraints
minimise compliance costs
sufficient certainty, minimal disruption
COMPETITION
A means to the end of increased efficiency
not an end in itself
What sort of competition?
infrastructure (facilities-based) competition
the long-run objective of Access Regulation
outcome of the „Ladder of Investment‟
efficacy of Access Regulation reduced
services competition (basis is Access Regulation)
as long-run solution presumes eventual infrastructure competition 
infeasible
but presumes some inputs are replicable (retail, backhaul, 
DSLAMs etc)
benchmark competition
UFB NOT IMPLEMENTED IN A VACUUM
Existing infrastructure investments
Telecom (FTTC/ADSL2+ network)
unbundling competitors‟ investments (DSLAMs, backhaul, etc)
other infrastructure competitors
TelstraClear  HFC (Wellington, Christchurch)
CityLink dark fibre (Auckland, Wellington) 
Increasing competition from mobile competitors
Rapidly maturing residential broadband access market
very elastic w.r.t. faster connections (TelstraClear evidence)
no obvious „killer apps‟ (except HD/3D video on demand)
IMPLICATIONS FOR BROADBAND MARKET
Government investment a „strategic shock‟
What objective?
sustainable industry? 
what market?
What subgoal?
allowing consumer technology choice?
incentivising efficient investment in infrastructure?
promotion of competition?
What principles govern the investment?
How does this affect regulation?
ASSUMPTION 1:
FIBRE IS A ‘FRONTIER TECHNOLOGY’
One „bottleneck‟ infrastructure replaces another
Investment „brings forward‟ the substitution of „legacy‟ 
copper networks with fibre connections?
scale economies => rapid substitution from copper to fibre required
Implications for regulation of copper network
structural separation antithetic to rapid, co-ordinated substitution of 
subscribers from copper to fibre 
sustained access regulation of copper network access leads to 
fierce competition on copper network
avoids asset stranding (Telecom and unbundling entrants)
lower ADSL prices => delayed uptake of fibre
what role for „ladder of investment‟?
fibre ownership restrictions eliminate copper investment incentives
IMPLICATION 1
ONGOING REGULATION OF COPPER 
NETWORK COUNTER-INDICATIVE TO 
UFB UPTAKE OBJECTIVES
regardless of how the frontier technology might be 
regulated
ASSUMPTON 2:
FIBRE NETWORK INDUCES INFRASTRUCTURE 
COMPETITION FOR COPPER BOTTLENECK
Infrastructure competition is end objective of Access 
Regulation (and „ladder or investment)
Government has invested because 
(a) the ladder has not been climbed „fast enough‟???
(b) Access regulation has chilled investment by both the 
incumbent and entrants????
If Government investment implies Access Regulation has 
„failed‟, why persist with it?
if fibre truly superior, then copper access regulation regime 
irrelevant
ongoing AR simply distorts fibre uptake
IMPLICATION 2
ONGOING REGULATION OF COPPER 
NETWORK COUNTER-INDICATIVE TO 
UFB UPTAKE OBJECTIVES
And regulation of the frontier technology needs to be 
rethought if infrastructure competition is to be truly 
technology-neutral
SO WHAT IS GOVERNMENT COMPETITION 
POLICY?
Government investment to promote infrastructure 
competition?
Telecom rivals get contracts for Northland, Central North 
Island, Timaru
but also Christchurch, where infrastructure competition already 
exists
but Telecom gets contracts where infrastructure 
competition already exists 
Wellington, Kapiti, Lower Hutt
as well as substantial areas where it doesn‟t
e.g. Dunedin, Auckland
AND WHAT IS GOVERNMENT POLICY ON 
REGULATION?
Investment because Access Regulation has failed?
Access Regulation is retained for all copper services exactly as 
if there was no UFB 
No distinctions in regulation of copper network despite 
very different competition profiles in many areas
Telecommunications Commission oversees COPPER 
ACCESS REGULATION as before
plus enforces UFB undertakings
But no power to meaningfully review BROADBAND 
MARKET COMPETITION  in a technologically 
neutral manner
problematic given different approach taken to UFB contracts in 
different geographic regions
PRINCIPLES GOVERNING BROADBAND 
MARKET COMPETITION 
What has been revealed so far suggests inconsistency, 
lack of clarity
So unsurprising to find regulatory policy is at odds with 
government fibre uptake objectives
Unclear how market under current regulation will 
respond to exogenous shocks
technological change
political uncertainty
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
Ever more capable mobile networks
especially relevant for sparsely populated locations (e.g. NZ)
More capability being eked out of copper
Sparsity of new applications necessitating ubiquitous 
high-speed symmetric access
Increasing evidence of elastic customer demand
speed isn‟t everything
high usage does not necessarily mean highly-valued usage 
(especially for users inured to flat-rate pricing)
large skews in demand for high capacity networks
IS THERE A SOLUTION?
Resolving competition policy objectives before 
government contracts tendered/let would have 
reduced confusion, improved consistency
comparison - Australian NBN 
But still no substitute for first defining the market(s) and 
then identifying any inefficiencies before selecting an 
appropriate remedy that Increases market efficiency 
whilst simultaneously 
minimises compliance costs
provides sufficient certainty for market participants and 
minimises transition disruption
NZ
A broadband market in search of an 
overarching competition policy to guide 
regulatory decision making, market 
interactions and (ultimately) technological 
innovation in the sector
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